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Abstract
The designer of internal labour market promotion contests must balance the need to
select the best candidate with the need to provide incentives for all candidates. We use
an extensive data-set from horse racing — where there is abundant variation in contest
design features — to analyse if there are particular features that help to achieve these
two objectives. We find that contests with higher prize money, and fewer participants,
are the most successful at achieving the dual remit of selection and incentives.
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1 Introduction
Competition for promotion within a firm has often been likened to a contest, where all em-
ployees exert effort but only some receive a prize (Konrad, 2009). In these contests a trade-off
exists between promoting the most able employee with high probability, and yet also giv-
ing incentives for weaker employees to continue exerting effort until the promotion contest is
decided (Tsoulouhas et al., 2007, Höchtl et al., 2011). If the contest is too heavily skewed
towards stronger candidates, then weaker candidates will cease to exert effort, and their po-
tential output will be lost. Level the playing field, however, and the firm may be left with
inferior employees in senior positions.
In this paper we exploit the abundant variation in contest design features in horse racing
to establish whether any particular design feature can both help to select the best and yet
ensure that all participants are sufficiently incentivized until the end of the contest. Horse
races vary in terms of winner incentives (prize money), difficulty (distance, hurdles), requisite
quality (class), and the number of participants (runners). Just as important as this variation
in design features, we have clean measures of both selection and incentives. We measure
selection by the frequency with which the favourite — more often than not the best horse in
the race — won the race. We measure incentives by the frequency with which horses were
pulled-up (i.e. quit) before the race was completed. As injured horses, or those involved in
an accident or a fall, are classified separately, we can assume that those that ‘pull-up’ only do
so because they have drifted out of contention and have given up on victory. A lagging horse
(and jockey) quitting a race before the finishing line is, according to our analogy, akin to a
discouraged employee giving up on future promotions and deciding to down tools.
Our results suggest that features which are successful in eliciting continued effort from
all runners are, in the main, less successful in ensuring that the best horse prevails. The
exceptions are 1) races with relatively high prize money for the winner, and 2) races with fewer
participants. As races with fewer participants have arguably discouraged weaker participants
from even entering the race, only high stakes races appear to fit the dual remit of selection
and incentives.
Horse racing has been used previously in the study of contest design features. For example,
Lynch (2005) shows that a steeper prize structure — where the difference in prize money be-
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tween first and second, for example, is greater — leads to quicker running times and implicitly
more effort. Coffey and Maloney (2010) use horse and dog racing data to disentangle the
component of effort that is caused by incentives, from the component of effort that is observed
because of higher quality selection. Horse racing is particularly well-suited to the objectives
of our study for three reasons. Firstly, it has perhaps the greatest variation in contest design
features of any sport. There is almost a continuum of prizes, distances, classes, and runners to
be observed in horse racing, plus clear differences between flat and jump racing. Secondly, in
common with most sports but in contrast with most labour market environments, it is possible
to ex-ante identify the most able competitor in horse racing by using the prices observed in the
pre-race betting market. Thirdly, in contrast to most sports and labour market environments,
we have a remarkably clean measure of low effort. The 28,382 (5.1%) horses that pull-up in
our sample have, by definition, ceased to exert any more effort in the pursuit of victory.
The trade-off between selection and incentives in contests has been examined experimen-
tally by Höchtl et al. (2011). Specifically, the authors examined how the ex-ante closeness of
the contest affected the two objectives. Our paper is, however, the first field evidence on this
subject involving professionals, and also considers the effects of a broader range of natural
contest features. Other than this work, selection and incentives have generally been consid-
ered separately in the literature. For example, designing contests or tournaments so that
they are effective in selecting the best competitor has been considered theoretically by Hvide
and Kristiansen (2003), Rvykin and Ortmann (2008), and Rvykin (2010), and empirically by
Harbraugh and Klumpp (2005) and Klumpp and Polborn (2006). Regarding incentives, it has
been shown theoretically (Lazear and Rosen, 1981), and in the field (Sunde, 2009, Brown,
2011, Franke, 2012, and Genakos and Pagliero, 2012) that uneven contests elicit less effort
from weaker participants. As we stated, this is the first analysis to jointly establish whether
a range of contest features can help in the achievement of both selection and incentive goals.
Our work also builds on a more general theme of trade-offs in contest design features.
For example, Boudreau et al. (2011) identify a trade-off in innovation contests in computer
software development. On the one hand, adding competitors to the contest increases the
probability of achieving an ‘extreme-value solution’ to the particular innovation problem. On
the other hand, for less difficult innovation contests, the addition of competitors discourages
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others and leads to lower effort and investment. In our paper we empirically identify a com-
parable trade-off, but show that there is the possibility that certain features can achieve the
dual aims of the contest designer.
2 Data
We collected data on 54,090 U.K. horse races run between 1st January 2005 and the 31st
December 2010. These races included a total of 557,296 runners. This data was obtained
from Betwise, a U.K. based betting information firm. Of the 54,090 races in our sample,
29,806 (55.1%) were handicap races. In such races a handicapper assigns different weights to
each horse, with the intention of giving every horse the same chance of victory. In addition,
18,274 (33.8%) of the races in our sample were jump races, where horses must clear a succession
of hurdles. Races also vary in terms of distance (from 1,100 yards to 7,920 yards) and in terms
of prize money for the winner (from 0 to 1 million GDP). Finally, races are graded by class,
with 1 the most prestigious (and most difficult to enter), and 7 the lowest.
Our analysis can be summarised in just two regressions, the results of which are displayed
in Table 1. In the first regression, the dependent variable is an indicator equalling 1 if the
favourite (i.e. the horse with the shortest win odds in the race) ultimately won the race. This
is regressed on the race design features described above, plus the age and squared age of the
favourite to control for physiological variations over the horse’s career. If a race has a joint
favourite, we include both horses, though our results are robust to discarding all but the first
favourite as decided by alphabetical order. This first regression is estimated using a logit
specification, with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. In our second regression, the
dependent variable is an indicator equalling 1 if the horse in question pulled-up, i.e. quit before
the end of the race. The explanatory variables are the same as the first regression, but this time
we include all 557,296 runners in the sample. A logit specification is again used, but standard
errors are now clustered at the race level in addition to being heteroskedasticity-consistent.
We are looking for race design features which correlate with a higher frequency of the
favourite winning (i.e. selection attributes), and also correlate with a lower frequency of
dropouts (i.e. incentives for all). For this dual remit to be satisfied, we require that the
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estimated coefficients of the two regressions differ in their sign. The majority of the design
features are suitable for one objective, but not the other. For example, handicapping levels
the playing field and ensures continued effort from more horses (as witnessed by lower dropout
rates), but the best horse (if indeed the favourite is the best horse in a handicap) wins less often.
Similarly, jump races — which are arguably more difficult and hazardous — are proficient at
weeding out weaker horses (the favourite wins more often), but horses are much more likely
to pull-up in these races.
There are two design features which appear to satisfy the selection and incentives criteria.
These are 1) the prize money awarded to the winner, and 2) the number of horses in the race.
Specifically, those races with higher stakes, and fewer competitors, see the favourite win more
often, and yet are still aﬄicted by fewer mid-race dropouts. Of course, these results could be
driven by a selection bias. Most obviously, a race with few competitors has arguably already
discouraged weaker horses: after all, a horse that does not participate cannot be observed
falling behind and then quitting. A similar, albeit more subtle, effect may be at play in high
stakes races. Consider a high stakes race that attracts stronger horses. The presence of these
horses deters weaker horses from entering. Therefore, we do not observe a high dropout rate,
since the other horses have not even taken part. Crucially, however, the proficiency of high
stakes races in both selection and incentives criteria remains even after we control for the
number of entrants in these races. Our intuition is that high stakes races attract and motivate
the best, and, because of the size of the prize at stake, still manage to keep weaker competitors
interested, even when their chances of victory are negligible.
One remaining concern is an omitted variable bias. Although we have a range of observables
to use as controls, there may be unobservable factors, correlated with win prize money, which
are predominantly driving the two results. Although the success of prize money in the selection
and incentives criteria is intuitively sensible, further work in controlled laboratory conditions
could see whether the effect holds once unobservable variation is eliminated.
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Table 1: Analysis
Dependent Variable: Favourite Won Race Pulled Up
1 2
Intercept 0.105 -8.629***
(.064) (.081)
Handicap Indicator -0.494*** -0.135***
(.019) (.017)
Jump Race Indicator 0.187*** 3.166***
(.039) (.049)
Distance (000s of yards) 0.017 0.505***
(.013) (.011)
No of Horses in Race -0.073*** 0.042***
(.002) (.002)
Class 0.041*** 0.165***
(.007) (.007)
Win Prize (000s of GBP) 0.0007* -0.002***
(.0003) (.0002)
Age -0.035. 0.067***
(.02) (.018)
Age2 -0.0009 -0.001
(.001) (.001)
No. of Observations 59,494 557,296
Pseudo R2 0.026 0.279
Regressions to establish whether certain types of contests are able to select the best candidate
with high probability, and yet also incentivize continued participation by all contestants. In our
first regression we regress an indicator variable, equalling 1 if the favourite (i.e. the best horse)
won the race, on a variety of contest design features. (We include all joint favourites in this
regression). In our second regression we include all runners (not just the favourite) and regress
an indicator, equalling 1 if the horse was pulled-up mid-race (i.e. quit), on the same contest
design features. Logit specifications are used in both regressions. Standard errors (displayed in
parentheses) are heteroskedasticity-consistent in both regressions, and are clustered at the race
level (N=54,090) in regression 2. ., *, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%
and 0.1% level respectively.
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